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CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: A NEW LOOK AT




Despite a culture that embraces judicial restraint as an
article of faith in American constitutionalism, the United States
Supreme Court has been a prime mover in effecting
constitutional change throughout American history. By the
skillful use of judicial review, the Court has been the architect of
"constitutional revolutions," which continue to shape and
reshape the relationship between American government and its
citizenry.' Given the Supreme Court's preeminence in
* Professor of Law and H. Albert Young Fellow in Constitutional Law, Widener
University School of Law. I am grateful to Rod Smith for his important contributions to the
development of this essay's central theme. I also thank Tom Sullivan for his helpful
comments. During the 1984-85 term, Professor Lipkin was a judicial clerk for the
Honorable Gilbert S. Merritt, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
1. Robert Justin Lipkin, Constitutional Revolutions: Pragmatism and the Role of
Judicial Review in American Constitutionalism (Duke U. Press 2000).
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revolutionary adjudication,2 the question naturally arises as to
what role lower appellate courts should play in the American
constitutional scheme. This essay presents a distinctly
jurisprudential response to this question, one that concentrates
on the role of the lower appellate courts in the transformation
and growth of constitutional law.3 Jurisprudential commitments
will then determine, in part, the function of lower appellate
courts and thus should be spelled out carefully.4 Because my
conception of constitutional law is committed to a particular
theory of constitutional change-namely the theory of
constitutional revolutions-my jurisprudential approach to
lower appellate review will be explicated in terms of this
theory.
My overarching goal is to explain how lower appellate
review operates ideally in a judicial regime committed to
democracy and judicial review. More specifically, I focus on
explaining lower appellate review in the American constitutional
democracy.6  This explanation functions as a normative
2. Of course, both conservative and liberal jurists alike resist this description of the
Supreme Court as engaged in revolutionary adjudication. See generally Bruce Ackerman,
We the People: Foundations vol. I (Belknap Press 1991); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of
America: The Political Seduction of the Law (Macmillan 1990); Ronald Dworkin,
Freedom's Loaw: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard U. Press
1996); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Belknap Press 1986); Antonin Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton U. Press 1997); but see Lipkin,
supra n. 1, chs. 1-2.
3. This jurisprudential question queries whether lower appellate review is positivist,
naturalist, coherentist, or pragmatist, or some integrated conception of these different
theories. One's general jurisprudential commitments will affect how one answers this
question. Other types of responses are, of course, possible and necessary. See Erwin
Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. Rev.
67, 77-87. In general, discussions of the role of appellate courts may be legal, political,
administrative, or some combination of these functions. See generally Daniel J. Meador,
The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1031 (1979); Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376 (1982).
4. One result of this explication will be to describe and legitimize the important
contribution lower appellate judges make in American constitutionalism.
5. See generally Lipkin, supra n. 1.
6. My explanation is only a partial explanation of lower appellate review. My interest
centers on lower appellate review in constitutional cases, not cases of statutory
construction.
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interpretation of American constitutional law but one whose
origins lie in actual judicial practice.7
Judicial review is a primary vehicle for bringing about
constitutional change.8 Thus, an interpretation of judicial review
requires an interpretation of constitutional change. Both
interpretations presuppose a certain conception of the role of the
courts in a constitutional democracy. In my view, functionalist
conceptions of the role of the judiciary are far more plausible
than formalist conceptions. Under a functionalist conception,
the role of the judiciary is best evaluated by how well it
contributes to the purposes of the governmental system under
examination, in this case a democratic government.0° According
to this pragmatic approach, judicial review arguably has
contributed toward rendering American democracy deliberative,
reflective, and progressive. '
7. A normative interpretation of judicial practice must provide an adequate description
and explanation of that practice. Without such a description and explanation, a proposed
normative interpretation is uninterestingly utopian. However, I do not mean to denigrate
utopian interpretations of constitutional law, only those that have no currency in actual
practice. For my views on utopianism, see Robert Justin Lipkin, Liberalism, Radicalism
and Utopian Ideals, 19 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1033 (1990).
8. Yet, constitutional change comes about also through non-judicial activities. See
Ackerman, supra n. 2; Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the
Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988).
9. Functionalist conceptions attend to history, context, consequences, and
constitutional efficacy, while formalist conceptions tend to emphasize sharp distinctions
and exhaustive rules.
10. Elsewhere I present a framework for examining different conceptions of democracy
and their relationship to judicial review. See Lipkin, supra n. 1, for an initial attempt to
specify the framework for discussing constitutional democracy. See also Robert Justin
Lipkin, The New Majoritarians, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 107 (2001) [hereinafter Lipkin, New
Majoritarians].
11. This contention is now under attack from progressives who want to restrict the
scope of judicial review. See generally Ackerman, supra n. 2; Richard Parker, Here the
People Rule: A Constitutional Populist Manifesto (Harvard U. Press 1994); Cass R.
Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard U.
Press 1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press 1993); Robin
West, Progressive Constitutionalism: Reconstructing the Fourteenth Amendment (Duke U.
Press 1994). The composition of the present Court, as well as that of the federal judiciary
generally, may explain why progressives are now singing what in recent years was a
conservative tune. It should be noted, however, that New Deal progressives, among others,
often sought a limited role for the courts. Now some progressives seek to eliminate judicial
review. For reasons why we should tread cautiously here, see Lipkin, New Majoritarians,
supra n. 10.
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Because my understanding of judicial review is
functionalist and pragmatic, my conception of appellate review
will follow suit. This essay presents a novel, controversial
conception of lower appellate review that differs radically from
the traditional and more familiar conception of appellate
practice. 2 According to the theory of constitutional revolutions,
appellate review has a more definitive and intelligible dimension
than it has under the traditional conception. In this essay, I
sketch the familiar and traditional conception of appellate
judicial review and then contrast it with the theory of
constitutional revolutions, thereby identifying a frequently
unnoticed role of both state and federal appellate courts. My
initial purpose is to describe and explain how lower appellate
review in fact functions in the creation and articulation of
constitutional revolutions. My second purpose is to urge lower
appellate judges to appreciate their role in revolutionary
adjudication so that they might more self-consciously perform
this function in the future.
A constitutional revolution such as Brown v. Board of
Education3 is an abrupt shift or redefinition of a constitutional
paradigm in constitutional law and throughout the American
legal system. Brown was a quintessential constitutional
revolution, creating a new constitutional paradigm of equal
protection and thereby abandoning the reigning paradigm
enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson.4 It applied the new paradigm
to public schools and began the elimination of Jim Crow
segregation throughout civil society.
Although every serious scholar tries to demonstrate the
legitimacy of the reasoning behind the decision, no consensus
exists over how Brown's reasoning comports with ordinary
methods of legal construction. Neither textualism,
intentionalism, process theory, tradition, history, nor any other
conventional constitutional methodology explains to everyone's
12. Although this conception is novel, revolutionary adjudication is not novel at all.
Appellate courts already engage in revolutionary adjudication. The problem is that because
constitutional culture implicitly rejects revolutionary adjudication, lower appellate judges,
especially, often fail to recognize their role as harbingers of revolutionary adjudication. My
hope is that this essay can begin a reexamination of the vital role of lower appellate review
in revolutionary adjudication and, more importantly, in a deliberative democracy.
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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satisfaction the result in Brown without begging the question of
the case's legitimacy. Legal pragmatism is the only explanation
for Brown, because legal pragmatism warrants a decision if it
promises a better future, not because it necessarily flows from
the past. The problem is that while everyone valorizes Brown,
few candidly acknowledge just how revolutionary its reasoning
is. Brown's reasoning sanctions, in certain circumstances,
abandoning ordinary legal conventions in favor of a novel,
normatively compelling paradigm. Yet, according to standard
accounts of law, this is the epitome of illegitimacy. Thus, if we
embrace Brown's reasoning, we must revise or abandon the
traditional view of legal legitimacy as a decision following from
prior law.'5
Such a revision has implications for lower appellate review.
Scholars pay great attention to those revolutionary "landmark
cases" created by the Supreme Court, but generally ignore the
role lower appellate courts play in constitutional change. 6 This
oversight can be remedied through attention to the fundamental
role lower appellate review plays in the development and
transformation of constitutional law. Before discussing this
remedy, however, it is necessary to contrast revolutionary
constitutional adjudication with the traditional conception of
constitutional change. Part II of this essay sets out the traditional
conception of constitutional change. Part III then discusses the
role of appellate review in the traditional conception of
constitutional change, and, contrastingly, part IV discusses the
theory of constitutional revolutions. Part V concludes the essay
by reviewing the role of lower appellate review in revolutionary
adjudication.
II. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The traditional conception of constitutional change reflects
a similarly traditional conception of scientific and conceptual
change generally. According to this conception, scientific and
conceptual change is incremental and evolutionary. The present
15. See Lipkin, supra n. 1, which attempts to support this claim.
16. Unfortunately, while scholars pay great attention to landmark cases, they generally
fail to recognize the revolutionary dimensions of these cases.
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state of an intellectual domain, including the intellectual
component of law, is revised and extended but never
significantly abandoned. Similarly, constitutional change is
evolutionary, not revolutionary. The present content of
constitutional law has systematically evolved from original
constitutional factors. What is now given in constitutional law
results from an elaborate, systematic, and rationalist network of
interlocking principles and rules that has never abandoned the
original constitutional premises-except when amended through
Article Five of the United States Constitution. Contemporary
constitutional law may be the result of transformative processes,
but these processes have never repudiated their canonical
origins."
Under this traditional view, constitutional conflicts have
determinate answers that can be derived from the correct
conception of constitutional interpretation or constitutional
reasoning. This canonical conception of constitutional reasoning
appeals to such conventional factors as text, intent, structure,
tradition, and history. These conventional factors determine a
constitutional given that is never repudiated but rather present in
some form in the new landmark decision. Because this
constitutional given always determines the new result, the latter
is not new, but is already contained in the given.
Therefore, no genuinely revolutionary constitutional
meaning is ever created legitimately through judicial
interpretation. That is left for formal change through Article
Five. Under the traditional view, constitutional change might
expand constitutional meaning, but it never does, or never
should, create new constitutional meaning. Constitutional
conventions are always the basis for constitutional change; thus,
all legitimate change is merely an elaboration, though
17. The term "transformative" is ambiguous; it might mean a complete change or a
partial change. The former occurs when one principle contradicts and therefore replaces the
original principle. For example, the Seventeenth Amendment completely "transformed"
Article I, Section 3, clause I, by rejecting the provision "chosen by the Legislature"
outright. Less than complete transformations might occur when one principle extends the
scope of another, as when Brown and subsequent decisions transformed the Equal
Protection Clause. According to the theory of constitutional revolutions, both types of
transformation are involved in constitutional change. Both types of transformation are also
arguably revolutionary. However, the first type of transformation is paradigmatically
revolutionary.
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sometimes a surprising elaboration, of what is already there. In
the traditional conception of law, questions of law are subject to
the traditional metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of
truth, objectivity, and justification. Judges, like other inquirers,
are always seeking the true meaning of the law; they seek law
that is real and objectively justified or justifiable.
III. THE ROLE OF APPELLATE REVIEW IN THE TRADITIONAL
CONCEPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
In the traditional conception of constitutional change,
intermediate appellate review is a penultimate stage in the
pursuit of legal truth."s A trial court's traditional role is to
determine which law applies to the facts of the case and what
that law means. This latter question, under the traditional
conception, is understood to query what the law truly is.
In this manner, the notion of appellate review enters the
legal universe as one more stage of truth-finding about the
meaning of the law. The traditional conception of appellate
review provides another level of judicial inquiry to decide
whether the earlier judgments of law made by the trial court are
correct. 9 This conception of judicial scrutiny is committed to a
modernist conception of truth, reason, and reality in legal
reasoning. In any system of law constructed along the lines of
American federal and state practice, the appellate court is part of
an integrated process of discovering truth. The trial court makes
the first attempt to arrive at the truth, while the Supreme Court
has the final say. The lower appellate court represents an
intermediate stage in this three-tier approach to the truth. A
conspicuously apt statement of the traditional conception can be
found in the following:
18. See Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or
Collegiality Under Challenge? 42 Md. L. Rev. 766, 768 (1983) ("[W]e want courts to
make correct decisions on the myriad cases and motions they face. Basically, decisions
should accurately reflect the facts in the record and existing law on the subject,").
19. In the American legal system, two well-developed sub-systems exist, namely, the
federal system and the state system. The American system, however, could have developed
without inferior federal courts, leaving the Supreme Court as the only federal appellate
court over state courts. See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System (Macmillan 1927).
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Best understood, the policy justification of the appeal as of
right is to improve only incrementally on the correctness of
the trial court result. The system commits all those
resources to the important task of sorting through the
appeals to identify the relatively small minority of cases in
which an error has occurred that needs remedying. Every
appellate court practice and procedure can be justified
solely insofar as it furthers this sorting task.' °
This notion of "remedy" is the familiar idea that law has
determinate meaning and sometimes judges misperceive what
this meaning is. If judges had a God's eye view of the law in a
given case, there would be no need for appellate review.
Appellate review, therefore, is an attempt to get us closer to the
true meaning of a given law than where we would be without
this additional mechanism. Thus, the sole justification in a
system of lower appellate courts lies in how well these courts
contribute to getting the true or right answers to legal questions.
Other purposes not explicable in terms of truth are irrelevant to
this system.
This traditional view of law is a realist view that coheres
with our common sense understanding of law as well as our
intuitively entrenched conceptions of truth, reality, and
reasoning.2' We imbibe this realist conception of human inquiry
with our mother's milk. Western metaphysics and epistemology
ground this view through language, which incorporates these
conceptions, rendering alternative views at best difficult to state
and at worst unintelligible. 22 This language of realism might be
inevitable on some level. 23 Nonetheless, this traditional realist
20. Thomas E. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal: The Problems of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals 26-27 (West Publg. Co. 1994).
21. See generally Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the
New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 Cornell L.
Rev. 811 (1990); Robert Justin Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes without Tails:
Pragmatism and the Art of Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 69 (1991).
22. Our language embodies particular methods of inquiry and ways of resolving
controversies. If language is contingent, then these methods are also contingent, and
therefore, could be different. Though contingent, they nevertheless represent our way of
understanding the world. Alternative ways of understanding are difficult or impossible to
state without changing or doing irreparable violence to our language.
23. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Pragmatism-The Unfinished Revolution: Doctrinaire
and Reflective Pragmatism in Rorty's Social Thought, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1561 (1993).
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view is presently under attack in law as well as across
intellectual inquiry .
This traditional conception of law is unpersuasive because
the traditional conception of metaphysics and epistemology
upon which it depends is implausible and unproductive.25 And,
because it depends on the traditional conception of law, the
traditional conception of appellate review is similarly
unpersuasive. The traditional conception of metaphysics and
epistemology inadequately explains conceptual change that
relates the process through which new ideas or beliefs replace
current ones. According to the traditional conception, new ideas
are always added incrementally to old ideas. Thus, what we
know now always includes what was true in the past.
Knowledge never explodes onto the scene for pragmatic
reasons, obliterating past ideas; rather, each new piece of
knowledge carefully replaces some feature of our past
conceptual scheme.
The problem with this familiar view is that it distorts the
revolutionary dimension of conceptual change. Similarly, the
traditional view of law obscures the creative and pragmatic role
of courts in changing American constitutional law. American
constitutional law is revolutionary in the sense that the great
decisions of constitutional history do not follow conceptually
from instances of prior law.26
I have written and defended this theory of constitutional
revolutions elsewhere.27  In these pages, I explain the
implications this theory has for lower appellate courts. My
alternative approach recommends a new lexicon for describing
and explaining constitutional change. The value of this new
24. Id.
25. What makes these notions implausible and unhelpful are the interminable
philosophical debates about their proper meaning, as well as similar debates about whether
realism or anti-realism is the appropriate basis of knowledge and language.
26. I should add two qualifications. First, the great constitutional decisions do not
follow from prior law without expanding beyond recognition what counts as prior law.
Second, and related, the great constitutional decisions do not follow in a non-question-
begging manner from prior law. That is, these decisions do not follow from prior law
unless one assumes that the prior law already contains these great decisions. This is the
circular assumption.
27. See generally Lipkin, supra n. 1.
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constitutional language is its pragmatic efficacy in
understanding constitutional change.28
IV. THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS
The received picture of constitutional change regards the
Article Five process of amendment as the exclusive method of
drastic change. By contrast, the theory of constitutional
revolutions maintains that the engine of constitutional change
has little to do with formal amendments. Instead, constitutional
change occurs regularly through the acts of government and of
the people.29 The most controversial agent of non-Article Five
change is the Court, but Congress and the Presidency create
constitutional meaning at least as much as the judiciary.
For example, Congress's contemporary role has departed
from its original role as stated in the 1787 Constitution. At that
time, both the history and structure of the Constitution
designated Congress as the prime mover of political leadership
and change. The executive branch was devised to enforce law
whose origin and content was largely legislative. Clearly, the
executive played, with certain critical exceptions, a subordinate
role.30 Despite this beginning, and in spite of a formal limitation
on the terms a president may serve, the Presidency has evolved
to overshadow the legislature without any constitutional
amendment, even in spite of formally limiting the terms the
president may serve. More strikingly, the advent of the fourth
(administrative) branch of government created by the New Deal
is a radical change in the content and structure of American
constitutional government. Moreover, the Constitution nowhere
mentions judicial review, especially the capacious form of
28. Even if one wishes to retain the traditional view's commitment to truth and
evolutionary change, the pragmatist conception of judicial review can be viewed as
augmenting the traditional conception. In that case, the dualist conception of judicial
review provides an additional role for lower appellate courts in addition to their truth-
seeking function.
29. Bruce Ackerman, among some other observers, has recognized that most
constitutional change is informal. See Ackerman, supra n. 2.; but see Lipkin, supra n. 1,
ch. 1.
30. Early in American constitutional history, the President's veto was rarely used. See
Ackerman, supra n. 2.
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review that permits non-Article Five alterations in constitutional
law.
These, I submit, are facts of American constitutional life.
Yet much judicial practice and academic scholarship is designed
to reject these facts and show instead that constitutional change
always occurs through some canonical, though perhaps non-
obvious, method of justified transformation. However, no "non-
question-begging" account of such transformation has ever been
devised or is likely to be devised in the future. Consequently,
some informal conception of constitutional change is necessary.
The theory of constitutional revolutions is designed to
explain the informal but predictable methods of constitutional
change that have occurred since the Republic's inception. My
exploration of this theory has centered on the judiciary's role in
creating constitutional revolutions, though the theory itself
applies to all branches of government.3' Since Marbury v.
Madison,32 the Court has considered itself the guardian of
constitutional meaning.33 Further, since the Constitution does not
envision a legislative role for the Court, there must be a meta-
legislative function, if any at all, that permits the Court to
criticize or reflect upon the ordinary operations of legislative
government. This meta-role then asks the Court to determine
whether ordinary legislation coheres with the constitutional
framework of American constitutional politics.
The theory of constitutional revolutions, as applied to the
judiciary, denies that the great shifts in constitutional
interpretation can be adequately explained by the concept of
prior law or by some uncontroversial method of constitutional
interpretation. Of course, judges and academics alike accept the
myth, or more accurately the charade, that a legal decision is
illegitimate unless it can be explained by such conventional
constitutional factors as text, intent, structure, tradition, or
history. Indeed, these conventional constitutional factors cannot
31. It should be noted that the theory of constitutional revolutions, in its application to
the courts, extends to the common law, statutory law, and constitutional law. Thus,
revolutionary adjudication exists in common law adjudication and in statutory
interpretation. My focus, however, is its role in explaining constitutional revolutions.
32. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). The doctrine of judicial supremacy in interpreting the
Constitution is usually attributed to Marbury.
33. The Court has reaffirmed its role in interpreting the Constitution in Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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even explain the practice (or the character) of judicial review
itself. In fact, evidence exists that the Founders arguably
rejected a judicial role in scrutinizing legislation.34 Nevertheless,
most observers would insist rightly that judicial review is a well-
established and legitimate feature of American constitutional
government. The Constitution's role as final arbiter of political
controversy requires that someone interpret what it means.
Designating the Court to fill this job was Chief Justice
Marshall's great pragmatic legacy.
Rather than seeking external factors to legitimize the
Court's role in American constitutionalism, judicial legitimacy
should be reconceived in functionalist terms. A judicial decision
is legitimate then when it contributes to the realization of some
value fundamental to the constitutional system. The paramount
value of American constitutionalism is self-rule or self-
government. 5 Thus, a conception of judicial interpretation is
legitimate if it contributes to the efficient and just operation of
self-rule and self-government. To paint in broad strokes, the
ideas of self-rule and self-government are best expressed by the
concept of democracy. 6
It should be kept in mind that this value of democracy can
blunt the force of the charge that activist judicial review is
undemocratic. Activist judicial review is counter-majoritarian.
34. Several times during the constitutional convention, proposals were advanced (and
defeated) to create a Council of Revisions, consisting of the President and members of the
judiciary, who would review legislation before it went into effect. Erwin Chemerinsky,
Federal Jurisdiction 6-7 (Little, Brown & Co. 1989). The justification for such a council
"was defended as a check on legislative powers and as a vehicle to improve the legislative
process." Id. (footnote omitted). In fact, "[o]pponents successfully argued that it was
undesirable to involve the judiciary directly in the lawmaking process." Id. at 7. Of course,
the rejection of this device for reviewing legislation does not entail a rejection of judicial
review, but it makes the Framers' intent a doubtful evidentiary basis for justifying judicial
review. Nevertheless, many commentators contend that the Framers intended judicial
review. See id. n. 28. At best, the Framers' intent in this matter is inconclusive.
35. Self-rule and self-government are integrally related. Self-government is the
collective rule of independent, equal persons, with each person having sovereignty over
herself. This notion of self-sovereignty is as important in political theory as it is difficult to
explicate. See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality
(Harvard U. Press 2000). By using the ideas of independence and equality, I do not intend
to denigrate the role of community in the idea of self-rule or self-government.
36. The verdict is still out regarding whether democracy or republicanism is at the heart
of the American system. American politics, in my view, has never been entirely certain
how to integrate these two concepts or, failing that, how to choose between them.
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However, a counter-majoritarian method is not necessarily
undemocratic. If a particular conception of judicial inquiry
contributes more to the realization of an attractive conception of
democracy than does an alternative conception, then it is
democratic even if it is not majoritarian. The theory of
constitutional revolutions describes and defends the judicial role
as fully contributing to the democratic system underlying
American constitutionalism. This theory also helps to discover a
vital, though greatly overlooked, role for lower appellate courts.
Before getting too far ahead of my thesis, however, I
should describe the theory in greater detail. The theory of
constitutional revolutions distinguishes between two general
categories of adjudication: revolutionary adjudication and
normal adjudication.37  In revolutionary adjudication, the
Supreme Court, in a decision designed to quell a constitutional
crisis,38 makes new law by adopting a principle or rule that is the
functional equivalence of an Article Five amendment and will
be foundational or authoritative throughout the legal system. By
"new law" I do not mean a principle or rule that no one ever
heard of before or one that has not been present in American
constitutional culture. Rather, I mean a principle or rule that
cannot be explained or generated by such familiar constitutional
conventions as text, intent, structure, tradition, or history. Of
course, if one interprets these familiar conventions in a
sufficiently broad manner, these conventions can always explain
constitutional decisions, but that is because their broad
interpretation already includes the possibility or necessity of
37. The terms "revolutionary" and "normal" are interrelated in the theory. A decision
is the result of normal adjudication when reasonable judges arrive at the decision using
conventional interpretive factors. In normal adjudication, agreement among different
judges is generally achieved. When disagreement does occur in normal adjudication, its
parameters are narrow and clearly identifiable. Revolutionary adjudication occurs when
these conventional interpretive factors cannot explain the decision or when the explanation
defies reasonable consensus.
38. The theory of constitutional revolutions understands a "constitutional crisis" to
exist when an important constitutional or political controversy has no obvious resolution
according to existing law. Unless the controversy simply disappears or is eliminated
through Article Five, some governmental agency needs to resolve it. In the United States,
that agency is typically the courts. This interpretation of "crisis" differs from the more
popular sense of the term as illustrated in the recent election controversy.
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revolutionary adjudication. In other words, broadly interpreting
these conventions renders all decisions potentially revolutionary.
Admittedly, in a sufficiently broad interpretive framework, the
importance of the distinction between revolutionary and non-
revolutionary adjudication diminishes because conventional
factors no longer determine a decision, and thus, can no longer
be a constraint on adjudication. In such a framework,
revolutionary adjudication, not based on prior law, is normal and
legitimate.4 °
The causes of constitutional revolutions are typically
constitutional crises. Crises reflect internal or external problems
with the reigning paradigm in that area of constitutional law.
Constitutional revolutions take place when a court cannot
resolve a systemic or persistent conflict through conventional
constitutional factors, or when it can resolve the conflict only by
interpreting these factors in an expansive manner. Any vibrant
deliberative democracy will inevitably require a conduit through
which cultural and political changes affect constitutional law. In
the American constitutional republic, judicial review is part of
that conduit.
Constitutional revolutions inevitably occur when the
constitutional system takes morality seriously, as any
sufficiently democratic system must. In democratic societies,
constitutional provisions include liberty, equality, and
community, values that often conflict and which require
interpretation through ethics and political philosophy.4'
Inevitably, such interpretation will include factors from the
wider political and ethical culture.4'2 This is not an argument for
39. In other words, if "textual interpretation" includes anything that now can be
considered textual meaning, or if "Framers' intent" includes whatever we now think
reasonably included in the Framers' intent, then every decision can be explained by these
conventional factors, but only because their constraining influence has been drastically
reduced or eliminated entirely.
40. Even in this situation, the theory of constitutional revolutions will still illuminate
constitutional reasoning.
41. See generally Dworkin, supra n. 2.
42. When a constitutional value like equality is inextricably woven into the society's
cultural fabric, it is difficult to separate it from the narrower constitutional concept.
Moreover, equality as a cultural value has several different meanings. It means fairness,
merit, desert, and so forth. Different people will be exposed to particular conceptions of
equality depending on contingent features of their upbringing. This primary conception of
equality will have a great influence over the individual. When such a person matures and
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expansive constitutional interpretation. Rather, it is an
acknowledgment that any interpretation concerning
constitutional values requires political and moral judgments.
Saying that the Equal Protection Clause excludes homosexuals
is just as much a political and moral judgment as saying that it
does not. Our judicial system concerns morality all the way
down.
It is important to note that the distinction between narrow
and expansive interpretation does not track the distinction
between revolutionary and non-revolutionary adjudication.
Furthermore, once revolutionary adjudication has a place in the
democratic structure of constitutionalism, a call for abandoning
it is itself revolutionary. Although it might be possible
conceptually to call for one final revolution to end all further
revolutions, it is difficult to see how, practically, such a final
revolution can be made to stick. Even when such a final
revolutionary decision is made, the next time constitutional
crises promote challenges to the received interpretation of the
moral and political concepts undergirding the Constitution, there
will, quite naturally, be a call for revolutionary adjudication.
This is especially true in a society where the institution of
revolutionary adjudication has a long and distinguished history.
By contrast, in normal adjudication, conventional facts
enable judges to be guided by the reigning constitutional
paradigms through which members of the constitutional
community determine the relevant facts, standards of review,
analytic structures, and available remedies. Normal adjudication
takes place in cases where no crisis is present, and the current
paradigm suffices for resolving the particular constitutional
conflict.
Revolutionary adjudication and normal adjudication are
integrated in the theory of constitutional revolutions.
Revolutionary adjudication seeks normalization, but not at any
price. Instead, revolutionary adjudication seeks to resolve a
constitutional crisis, to make the law right, to improve American
political culture by constructing a new paradigm through which
to decide conflicts. Only then does revolutionary adjudication
becomes a judge, she becomes a member of a particular linguistic community with
concepts and rules of inference of its own. This judge will nevertheless feel the force of her
primary conception of equality whether she intends to or is even aware she is doing so.
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achieve normalization. Once a revolutionary paradigm is created
and stabilized, it becomes a part of normal adjudication. Recall
that the revolutionary paradigm in Brown is now a constitutive
feature of normal adjudication concerning equal protection.43
Today's revolutionary adjudication becomes tomorrow's normal
adjudication, creating a provisional closure in an area of the law.
Constitutional adjudication depends on paradigms for
understanding and resolving constitutional conflicts. Paradigms
are models that interpret foundational constitutional provisions.
These paradigms first delineate which types of facts are relevant
to a particular constitutional provision and which standard of
review is to be used in examining the issue. Once the
appropriate facts trigger the provision, the paradigm provides
instructions for how courts, or any constitutional decisionmaker,
should analyze the facts in question. The paradigm also states
the rule or rules of law that ground the analysis and the available
remedies. For example, in due process and equal protection
cases, the paradigm tells courts to first determine whether a
piece of legislation burdens a fundamental right or a suspect
class. If legislation fails to burden either, but instead merely
regulates economic or social welfare activities, then courts
should resolve the conflict through a deferential form of rational
basis scrutiny. If, by contrast, legislation burdens a fundamental
or quasi-fundamental right or a suspect or quasi-suspect class, a
higher level of scrutiny is required.
These instructions tell judges how they are to approach the
abstract concepts of liberty and equality in the Constitution.
Without paradigms, it would be impossible for judges or any
constitutional decisionmaker to determine the constitutionality
of a law without appealing arbitrarily and entirely to their
personal preferences. Constitutional paradigms, like legal
paradigms generally, are conceptual and practical, tying the
paradigm's conceptual core to the facts of the case. Normal
paradigms raise few conceptual problems, and judges can apply
them to the facts of the case in a settled manner. Normal
adjudication occurs when agreed-upon paradigms determine the
resolution of the present case. Constitutional revolutions occur
43. Of course, we have yet to normalize equal protection concerning affirmative action,
gay and lesbian rights, and other questions about political equality. Nevertheless, we have
reached closure, at least for the immediate future, about ordinary racial discrimination.
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when agreement on a paradigm's scope and content is no longer
possible and when an alternative paradigm is likely to replace
the normal one.
Therefore American constitutional law would not be
revolutionary if a paradigm came uncontroversially with each
constitutional provision. These paradigms would then constrain
judges, and no revolutionary judicial decision would be possible.
But constitutional provisions do not come with paradigms in
hand. Nevertheless, constitutional revolutions do not come out
of whole cloth. Prior constitutional adjudication often precedes
the construction of a new paradigm or the elimination of an old
one.
Typically, a special kind of adjudication precedes
revolutionary decisions. This adjudication can be described as
pre-revolutionary because it consists of decisions that are
precursors to revolution. Pre-revolutionary adjudication consists
of precursors that raise doubts concerning the continued viability
of the current paradigm. Such precursors are decisions that
formally retain the existing paradigm but modify it in ways that
suggest further modifications or even sometimes the
abandonment of the reigning paradigm." Before Brown, several
Supreme Court decisions were precursors to revolution,
implicitly urging or suggesting that the paradigm of equal
protection in Plessy was no longer viable.45
Pre-revolutionary adjudication is a central part of
constitutional revolutions. The particular content of pre-
revolutionary adjudication determines to a great extent the
precise character and nature of the revolution. Additionally, pre-
revolutionary adjudication sometimes contributes to stability by
raising the question whether revolutionary adjudication is
desirable in a particular area of the law. Once this issue is raised,
the Court may either engage in revolutionary adjudication or
quell the revolutionary furor by reaffirming the current paradigm
44. Professor Rod Smith suggests the idea of nontransivity to explain this process. In
pre-revolutionary adjudication, a series of precursors to the revolutionary decision begin to
modify the reigning paradigm. As the series progresses, consistency with the reigning
paradigm is less obvious until the (inconsistent) revolutionary case is decided.
Revolutionary adjudication relies on a nontransitive process that creates new law.
45. McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
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in that area of constitutional law. Pre-revolutionary adjudication
is central to constitutional revolutions, and constitutional
revolutions are central to the development of American
constitutional law.46
After the Court creates or modifies a constitutional
paradigm through a revolutionary decision, post-revolutionary
adjudication occurs. During this phase of adjudication, the Court
attempts to perfect, refine, extend, and stabilize the newly
minted paradigm, determining its contours and considering how
it affects other paradigms, as well as how it deals with similar
but independent questions of law. Ideally, a paradigm is
perfected when its scope and meaning are settled. At that point,
the paradigm is stabilized and normal adjudication can then
occur in that area of law.
V. THE ROLE OF LOWER APPELLATE REVIEW IN
REVOLUTIONARY ADJUDICATION
Lower appellate review, according to the theory of
constitutional revolutions, takes various forms, including normal
adjudication, or following and applying paradigms created by
the Supreme Court in all cases where a paradigm clearly reigns.
According to the traditional conception, normal adjudication is
the only kind of adjudication in which a lower appellate court, or
any other court, should engage. In this view, a lower appellate
court should simply ascertain which paradigm governs and
decide the case accordingly.47 However, normal adjudication is
not the only role of lower appellate courts in the theory of
constitutional revolutions. The theory identifies additional
responsibilities for lower appellate courts as well.
46. My concern is with American constitutional law. I do not insist that revolutionary
adjudication is necessarily a part of the constitutional law in every conceivable political
system. However, I would argue that when constitutional law is vibrant and part of the
transformative processes in a deliberative democracy, that law is likely to develop
according to the theory of constitutional revolutions.
47. It is not always acknowledged that giving a court the discretion to choose the
relevant paradigm already sets the stage for revolutionary adjudication. Of course, we hope
that any competent judge would know when the paradigm for speech, religion, or equal
protection applies to a given set of facts. But there is no non-question-begging way to
guarantee this. Therefore, revolutionary adjudication is likely to be a necessary feature of
any system of adjudication.
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Before specifying these additional responsibilities, it is
important to recognize that only the Supreme Court may create
new law by engaging in revolutionary adjudication. The reason
for this restriction is not that Supreme Court justices are
inevitably better judges than lower court judges. Indeed, history
is replete with examples of great lower appellate judges with
few, if any, peers among Supreme Court justices. Rather, the
reason is institutional.4 s In a system of adjudication where the
courts not only interpret but also necessarily make law, engaging
in revolutionary adjudication should be the responsibility of a
single court having the ultimate say in constructing the new
paradigm.49 Without such an institutional structure, different
levels of the judiciary will vy with one another to construct new
paradigms. Confusion and instability are the likely result of such
a practice. The theory of constitutional revolutions, therefore,
recognizes the importance of keeping the Supreme Court
"supreme."
The theory of constitutional revolutions creates a secondary
series of responsibilities for lower appellate review in a
constitutional system such as that of the United States. Because
revolutionary adjudication occurs only after pre-revolutionary
adjudication takes place, lower appellate courts should be
vigilant to determine whether current paradigms are sufficient to
resolve the cases for which they were designed. Engaging in
pre-revolutionary adjudication-responding to problems with
the current paradigm-is a job that appellate courts are
especially suited to do. In this way, a lower appellate court
functions as a scout, so to speak, or a lookout for the Supreme
Court, assaying the constitutional landscape for problems in the
48. Of course, state supreme courts similarly engage in revolutionary adjudication and
generally have the final say over the proper interpretation of state law.
49. In the traditional conception of lower appellate review, judges generally concede
the Supreme Court's final authority in interpreting the law. See J. Woodward Howard, Jr.,
Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System: A Study of the Second, Fifth, and District
of Columbia Circuits 138 (Princeton U. Press 1981). In our judicial system, "the higher the
court, the greater the freedom to innovate." Id. Similarly, in a system of revolutionary
adjudication, circuit courts would likely defer to the Supreme Court in fashioning new
constitutional paradigms. Even in the traditional conception of appellate review, however,
courts of appeals have the final say in ninety-nine percent of the cases they hear. Martha J.
Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does the
Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater
Threat? 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 757, 768 (1995).
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paradigms currently governing constitutional law. The Supreme
Court can acknowledge such pre-revolutionary adjudication in
two ways. It can quash the pre-revolutionary decision, or it can
respond by creating a constitutional revolution.
The theory of constitutional revolutions explains the
conduct of lower appellate courts in several situations. Lower
appellate courts engage in normal adjudication by applying the
reigning paradigm to the case at hand. The vast majority of
published and unpublished lower appellate court opinions are
instances of normal adjudication. Appellate judges have the
good sense, especially given the increase in appellate litigation,
to stick to a consistent posture as courts of normal adjudication.
Nevertheless, most appellate judges, at least implicitly,
appreciate the centrality of their additional role as courts of
revolutionary adjudication. Adhering to a current problematic
paradigm or modifying it slightly by using normal adjudication
can suggest a problem. Consequently, sometimes even without
mentioning the problem, by sticking to the reigning paradigm,
the Supreme Court might be struck with the paradigm's
inadequacy. Of course, mentioning the problem is usually
preferable to letting the Court discover the problem on its own.
Thus, lower appellate courts also engage in pre-revolutionary
adjudication by alerting the Supreme Court to a needed revision
in the reigning paradigm. Lower appellate courts then often
engage in the post-revolutionary stage of refining, perfecting,
extending, and finally stabilizing the newly formed paradigm.
The theory of constitutional revolutions explains the
appellate court's role in revolutionary adjudication. The best
recent example of revolutionary adjudication is Brown.5 ° At the
time of Brown, Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine governed
social equality between the races. Decisions rendered in four
states, however, helped trigger the revolution: Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.' Three of the decisions were
unfavorable to the plaintiffs, while the fourth ordered the
50. In Brown, several different cultural factors contributed toward triggering
revolutionary adjudication. See Lipkin, supra n. 1, ch. 3 (discussing the role of cultural and
moral factors in constitutional revolutions).
51. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951); Briggs v. Elliot, 103 F.
Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952);
Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952).
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integration of the public schools. The Kansas decision held that
segregated schools did not violate the equal protection
guarantee.52 The Virginia and South Carolina cases upheld the
Plessy paradigm but ordered the school districts to equalize the
facilities and/or curriculum of African-American public
schools. 3 The decisions in the Kansas, South Carolina and
Virginia cases were rendered by three-judge federal district
courts.
5 4
By contrast, the Delaware case ordered the integration of
the public schools based on Plessy's separate but equal
doctrine.55 Although Plessy had been deployed to order
integration in cases involving higher education, the Delaware
case was the first time elementary schools were ordered to
integrate for failure to comply with Plessy. The Delaware
Supreme Court decision is a good example of a genuine lower
appellate court precursor to revolution. Had the Supreme Court
vigorously enforced the doctrine in Plessy, half of the racial
injustice problem in the United States would have been resolved.
Because most school systems were separate but not equal, a
Plessy with teeth would have integrated public schools, or
guaranteed that all public schools would be equal.56
The lower courts, through normal and pre-revolutionary
adjudication, played a pivotal role in this constitutional
revolution. By indicating that the paradigm in Plessy was
problematic in contemporary society, the lower courts
52. Brown, 98 F. Supp. at 800.
53. Davis, 103 F. Supp. at 340-41; Briggs, 103 F. Supp. at 923. None of these courts
issued injunctions to equalize the facilities, and thus they followed a tradition of inaction in
rectifying racial inequality. Although not revolutionary in themselves, these instances of
normal adjudication, given the times, highlighted the problem of racial segregation for the
Supreme Court.
54. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486, n. 1. The three-judge courts were convened pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 2281 (repealed 1976) & 2284 (1994). The Court also considered a related appeal
before judgment issued in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in which the
same issue had been litigated under the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954).
55. Gebhart, 91 A.2d at 167, 172-73.
56. I say "half the problem" because segregation denied equality, a value that the Civil
War amendments imply. Even if the races were equal but separate in terms of opportunity
and accomplishment, the second half of the problem is that segregation in public schools
creates and reinforces a caste system in American politics, which is anathema to American
democracy. Alternatively stated, associational equality is a central feature of the Civil War
amendments.
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challenged the Supreme Court to re-evaluate the Plessy
paradigm. These courts, by taking the Plessy paradigm
seriously, especially in the Delaware case, indicated to the
Supreme Court that the paradigm must be abandoned or revised
to meet contemporary social reality. In effect, they were saying
that there was trouble here that the Court must address, while
leaving further change in the paradigm to the Court itself.
An even more recent example demonstrates the vital role
an intermediate appellate court can play in contributing to a full-
blown revolution. In United States v. Lopez,57 the Supreme Court
overturned, by a five to four vote, sixty years of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence by invalidating a federal statute
criminalizing handgun possession in a school zone. Because of
the Court's 1937 revolution and the post-1937 revolutionary
adjudication refining, perfecting, extending, and finally
stabilizing that revolution, the Commerce Clause had become
almost the functional equivalent of a constitutional provision
giving Congress general police powers. Although it might be too
soon to judge the extent of the Lopez revolution, the
revolutionary dimension of this decision cannot be
overestimated."
Lost in standard discussions of Lopez, however, is Judge
Garwood's appellate opinion from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.59 His opinion posed the issue with
precision, enabling the Supreme Court to carefully confront the
warring positions concerning the Commerce Clause and
federalism.6 ° Ultimately, the Supreme Court majority and
dissenting opinions eloquently and forcefully express these
warring opinions in Lopez. Here the lower appellate court played
an instrumental role in revolutionary adjudication."
57. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
58. Lopez could be seen as counter-revolutionary decision in reversing the 1937
revolution regarding the Commerce Clause. The terms "revolutionary" and "counter-
revolutionary" are relative to what one regards as the baseline. Because the present
constitutional community's baseline is a post-1937 understanding of the Commerce Clause,
Lopez is revolutionary relative to that baseline.
59. U.S. v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5thCir. 1993).
60. Id. (invalidating federal law prohibiting firearm possession in a school zone).
61. This is not to say that the Court would not have engaged in revolutionary
adjudication had the lower court engaged in normal adjudication. Sometimes a lower
court's normal adjudication will convince the Supreme Court not to engage in
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According to the theory of constitutional revolutions, the
Lopez revolution should alert lower appellate courts to a further
dimension of their role as courts of pre-revolutionary
adjudication. As mentioned above, such courts function as
scouts or lookouts in the revolutionary process. Lower appellate
courts should attempt to identify additional circumstances to
which the new Lopez paradigm applies. This is precisely what
the Fourth Circuit did in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and
State University,62 applying the new paradigm in Lopez to the
Violence Against Women Act and striking down a provision
giving victims of gender-motivated violence a civil cause of
action in federal courts. Here the Fourth Circuit refined and
extended the revolution in Lopez by striking down a federal law
with some, but not all, of the same defects as the statute in
Lopez. Subsequently, the Supreme Court then ratified the lower
court's extension of the Lopez revolution in United States v.
63Morrison. In addition to their primary role as courts of normal
adjudication, Lopez and Morrison reveal the importance of
lower appellate courts as courts of pre- and post-revolutionary
adjudication. 64
It is not always a majority lower court opinion that serves
as a precursor to revolutionary adjudication. In People v.
Lochner the highest state appellate court in New York argued
persuasively for validating a state law limiting the working
hours of bakers. Had the Supreme Court heeded this carefully
reasoned appellate opinion, the Lochner era of economic
substantive due process might not have occurred. Instead, the
Court in Lochner v. New York66 was more responsive to the state
appellate court's dissents. This indicates how dissenting lower
revolutionary adjudication while at other times a lower court's normal adjudication reveals
the fatal problems with the reigning paradigm. In both cases, however, the lower appellate
court plays an indispensable role in revolutionary adjudication either by encouraging the
revolution or by convincing the Supreme Court to stick with the current paradigm.
62. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
63. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
64. Just how far this revolution (or counter-revolution) in Lopez and Morrison will go
in revamping American federalism remains to be seen. But judging from the present
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as well as its conception of intergovernmental
immunities, it is a good bet that as we begin the third century of American
constitutionalism, a revolutionary new federalism is emerging.
65. 69 N.E. 373 (N.Y. 1904).
66. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
appellate court decisions also function as precursors to
constitutional revolutions. Furthermore, this intra-level
deliberative exchange shows the importance of published
written opinions generally in the revolutionary process.
The Supreme Court also often quashes a revolutionary or
post-revolutionary lower court opinion. In Bowers v. Hardwick,
6 7
the intermediate appellate court held that a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy infringed Michael Hardwick's right to
privacy. 6' According to the court, the right of intimate
association-even when involving homosexual acts illegal under
Georgia law-is a right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause 6 as interpreted in Griswold v.
Connecticut.7° Indeed, the argument for this position generally is
that one cannot value the privacy right in the Griswold case
without including a privacy right to be free from the
criminalization of homosexual sex. The dissent in the Eleventh
Circuit opinion, by contrast, argued that the Griswold paradigm
does not include a privacy right to be free from the
criminalization of homosexual sodomy. Here the lower appellate
court majority opinion attempted to perfect and refine the
paradigm in Griswold by revealing that it extends beyond a
heterosexual model of privacy. The Supreme Court in Bowers
specifically rejected the lower court's extension of the privacy
right to homosexual contexts. In this manner, closure and
normalcy has been achieved, at least regarding the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of the right of intimate association.7'
At the time of the decision, progressive voices throughout
contemporary society insisted that the extension of the right of
privacy is logically inevitable because the values of intimate
association in Griswold are not distinguishable from the freedom
of intimate association of homosexuals. The kind of sexuality
involved, according to these voices, is irrelevant to the centrality
67. 478 U.S. 186(1986).
68. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11 th Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 1211.
70. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
71. This does not, of course, mean that the Court was either constitutionally or morally
correct in excluding homosexual privacy interests in this way.
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of intimate association in one's life.72 The Court did not agree.
Instead, the Court insisted that
none of the rights announced in those cases bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.... [because n]o
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the
one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated, either by the Court of Appeals or by
respondent.73
In other words, the Court rejected the lower court's invitation to
continue post-revolutionary adjudication by perfecting and
refining the Griswold paradigm as stating a general moral
imperative concerning intimacy. Instead, the Court ended or
stabilized the post-revolutionary adjudication in the area of
intimate association and returned this area to normal
adjudication. Once again, the appellate court played a critical
role in attempting to perfect, refine, extend, and stabilize the
revolutionary paradigm by inviting the Supreme Court to extend
the scope of privacy. The fact that the Court declined the
appellate court's invitation should not detract from the
importance of this deliberative dialogue between different levels
of the judiciary in changing and developing constitutional law.
A conspicuously good example of the important role played
by appellate courts in their deliberative interaction with the
Supreme Court is Roberts v. United States Jaycees.74 In this
case, the Supreme Court decided that the First Amendment's
protection of free association did not invalidate a Minnesota law
requiring public accommodations to be free of gender
discrimination. In upholding the law, the Court engaged in
revolutionary adjudication because it permitted equality interests
to trump the First Amendment's right of free association by
allowing state regulation of private associations or clubs. This
revolutionary decision overturned a lower court's decision
invalidating the state law on the grounds of its incompatibility
with free association.75
72. Of course, conservatives reject that these two forms of intimate association are
similar at all.
73. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
74. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
75. 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983).
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What is so interesting about this case is that the lower
court's decision was itself an example of revolutionary
adjudication. In the lower court's decision, Judge Richard S.
Arnold invalidated the Minnesota law by introducing a much
broader conception of free association than the Supreme Court
was willing to accept.76 In Judge Arnold's opinion the
constitutional guarantee of free association was akin to the free
speech guarantee because just as free speech protects the speech
we hate, so too free association protects the association we
hate.77 Here we have a battle of revolutionary paradigms
between the lower court and the Supreme Court. Judge Arnold's
decision advocated a revolution concerning the concept of
liberty while the Court's decision in Roberts was revolutionary
concerning equality.
Once again, the importance of the lower appellate court's
role in revolutionary adjudication is apparent. By writing a
revolutionary decision concerning liberty or association, Judge
Arnold framed the issue in terms the Supreme Court could
evaluate carefully. More importantly, by engaging in
revolutionary adjudication, Judge Arnold alerted the Court to the
importance of resolving the conflict between these two different
paradigms. The Court declined Judge Arnold's invitation to
embrace association over equality, but this should not detract
from the important role Judge Arnold's revolutionary decision
played in the Supreme Court case. The value of lower appellate
revolutionary adjudication in this case is that it presented the
Court with the importance of a revolutionary paradigm
concerning free association. That the Court declined Judge
Arnold's invitation to revolutionary adjudication regarding
association and chose instead another revolutionary course is
irrelevant to the importance of the lower appellate court's role in
revolutionary adjudication. The importance here is the intra-
judicial deliberation that is so vital to a deliberative democracy.
This last point is essential and should be emphasized.
American judicial practice takes place in an inter-branch and
intra-branch deliberative government. The Court functions as
one of the lawmakers in this deliberative democracy. Within the
76. See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 1576.
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judiciary, the pre- and post-revolutionary operations of the
appellate courts serve this deliberative function. It alerts the
court to reasons for possible constitutional revolutions as well as
signaling the need for refining, perfecting, extending, and
stabilizing a revolution that has already begun. In this way, the
appellate courts and the Supreme Court function synergistically
in a deliberative democratic judicial system.
One final comment regarding the theory of constitutional
revolutions as a legal theory is in order. Because a legal theory
should have a descriptive component, whenever it explains an
area of judicial practice it illuminates what is already taking
place. For this reason, some observers like Stanley Fish
denigrate theory for being superfluous to our practical decisions.
Legal theory, according to Fish, cannot influence our conduct
because it exists on a level divorced from what we actually do.
If a theory is true, then it accurately describes what we already
do. Consequently, if true, it is irrelevant to our practical
reasoning. No one then can invoke a theory as a reason
explaining and justifying judicial conduct. Rules of thumb are
all we ever have and all we ever need in deciding what to do.7"
According to Fish, theories are irrelevant and talking about
theories is a waste of time. Fish would then insist that if the
theory of constitutional revolutions is true generally, or even if it
is true only regarding the function of lower appellate courts, it is
superfluous because lower appellate courts already engage in
revolutionary adjudication. According to Fish, then, the theory
has no practical effect.
The problem with this objection is that even if it is true,
recognizing that lower appellate courts already engage in
revolutionary adjudication, though described in terms of the
traditional theory as merely looking for truth, helps judges to
better appreciate their role in revolutionary adjudication. If the
theory of constitutional revolutions is true or persuasive, then
judges should use the theory to refine their jobs as judges. They
should realize, in short, that lower appellate courts serve as
courts of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary adjudication
in addition to courts of normal adjudication. Even if a modernist
conception of "theory" cannot influence our practical reasoning
78. Stanley Fish, The Trouble with Principle (Harvard U. Press 1999).
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as theory, it can certainly guide these decisions as rules of
thumb. Consequently, even if we agree with Fish that theoretical
knowledge cannot determine our practical decisions from
scratch, it nevertheless has an important role to play in practical
reasoning. In the judicial context, the theory of constitutional
revolutions should help judges refine their perception of what
they already do, and therefore help them perform this function
more self-consciously and with greater circumspection in the
future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lower appellate review has many important functions.
According to the traditional conception of law, appellate courts
are intermediate discoverers of truth. Appellate courts simply
seek to fortify trial courts in the pursuit of truth. In this familiar
conception, intermediate appellate review is one more stage in a
review process theoretically ending with the final judgment of
the Supreme Court. The theory of constitutional revolutions
understands constitutional law differently. According to this
theory, constitutional law changes in response to constitutional
and political crises. The ultimate role of law, in this theory, is
not some obdurate search for truth, whatever that would be, but
is instead the attempt to render constitutional law more relevant
to the political and cultural conflicts existing in American
society. Three stages of revolutionary adjudication exist,
according to this theory: pre-revolutionary, revolutionary, and
post-revolutionary adjudication. Appellate courts are suited to
engage in pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary adjudication.
In this manner, lower appellate courts assist the Supreme Court
in fulfilling its important role of engaging in revolutionary
adjudication. 9 This role enables lower courts to take their
important and rightful place in our constitutional deliberative
democracy.
79. The Supreme Court itself can also engage in these aspects of revolutionary
adjudication.
